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The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 283 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the

Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 1270.

[TIME: 1648]

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration

of the bill (H.R. 1270) to amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, with Mr. McInnis in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.

Under the rule, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Bliley] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Hall] each will control 30

minutes. The gentleman from Alaska [Mr. Young] and the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey] each will control 10

minutes.

The Chair understands that the gentleman from Colorado, [Mr. Dan Schaefer] will be recognized for the time of the

gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. Bliley], and the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, [Mr. Dan Schaefer].

Mr. DAN SCHAEFER of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. DAN SCHAEFER of Colorado asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DAN SCHAEFER of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, today the House of Representatives is considering H.R. 1270, legislation

to repeal the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and replace it with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997. Mr. Chairman,

H.R. 1270 was approved by the Committee on Commerce by a wide margin of 43 to 3, enjoys broad bipartisan support, and

was carefully crafted over a 2 1/2 -year period.

H.R. 1270 achieves the following four principal goals: number one, the acceptance of nuclear waste at an interim storage

facility in the year 2002; number two, it continues progress toward permanent disposal of nuclear waste at a geological

repository; number three, it improves safety by consolidating storage of nuclear waste; and, four, it enhances consumer

protection by ending the diversion of consumers' fees for other Federal programs.

Mr. Chairman, last year the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held in the Indiana Michigan Power

Company that DOE has a legal obligation to begin acceptance of nuclear waste in January of 1998. It is impossible for DOE

to fulfill its legal duty to begin acceptance in 1998, and under current programs that the DOE has, it will not be able to begin

acceptance until the year 2010.

H.R. 1270 enables DOE to fulfill its legal obligation to begin acceptance at an interim storage facility in 2002, an earlier date

that permits time for the NRC for licensing of this particular facility.

The overriding goal of the nuclear waste program since 1983 has been providing for permanent disposal of nuclear waste in a

geological repository. That goal is strengthened by H.R. 1270. Congress has always sought to avoid a competition for funding

between an interim storage facility and a repository. H.R. 1270 avoids such competition by providing ample funds to pursue

both programs. According to DOE, the funding provisions of H.R. 1270 provide sufficient funds to provide for interim storage

while maintaining the progress towards development of a permanent repository.

H.R. 1270 has protections designed to assure the interim storage facility cannot become a de facto permanent facility. There

are statutory limits to the nuclear waste that can be stored in the interim facility, 40,000 metric tons, a small portion of the

nuclear waste that will be generated, which is 115,000 metric tons.

The commitment to the repository in H.R. 1270 is reflected in the funding mechanism of the bill. H.R. 1270 provides for a fee

that must average 1 mill, one-tenth of a cent, between 1999 and the year 2010, but can fluctuate to match program needs.

Without this flexibility in the fee mechanism, funding for the repository may not be assured.

Maintaining the commitment to the repository is critical to the States that have significant amounts of defense nuclear waste at

DOE nuclear facilities: Washington State, Idaho, South Carolina. Most of these defense wastes cannot be accommodated at

an interim storage facility. They will have to be deposited in a repository of this nature. Continued progress on a repository is

crucial for these particular States.

During the hearings held by the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the Committee on Commerce on nuclear waste

legislation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission testified that on-site storage of nuclear waste is safe, but centralized storage of

nuclear waste offers even higher safety margins than what we have today.

Right now, nuclear waste is spread all over the country in scores of sites in 35 States. Consolidating nuclear waste at one site

will improve safety and provide for the enhanced protection and the public health and the public safety.

Since enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, consumers have contributed $13 billion, $13 billion, Mr.

Chairman, towards the nuclear waste program. Only a portion of these sums, $6 billion, has been spent on the program itself.

The rest has been effectively diverted to other Federal programs. This diversion has gotten so bad in recent years that only 15

cents, 15 cents of every dollar paid by consumers, has been spent on the nuclear waste program.

We need to protect the consumers and stop the diversion of nuclear waste fees to fund other Federal programs. H.R. 1270

protects the consumers in two ways: changing the fee to an annually adjusted fee that matches the appropriations level, and

thereby eliminating the diversion of funds to other programs; and capping the fee at 1 mill, one-tenth of a cent per kilowatt

hour. Under H.R. 1270, every penny of the fees paid by the consumers in the future will be spent on this particular program.

H.R. 1270 is consistent with the budget laws and does not violate pay-go requirements. It was not a simple matter to resolve

the budgetary concerns related to the bill reported by the Committee on Commerce in 1995. The committee went through a

great deal of effort to resolve budgetary concerns for one reason, a conviction that the diversion of fees paid by the consumers

must be halted. The current fee is considered a mandatory receipt, and deleting this fee was deemed to reduce those receipts.

The fee in H.R. 1270, since it is annually adjusted to match appropriation levels, is considered a discretionary fee.

The committee developed an offset for the loss of the mandatory receipts resulting from the switch from the flat mill fee

established by the 1982 Act to the annually adjusted fee in H.R. 1270. The offset the committee adopted was requiring the

payment of one-time fees owed by 13 utilities by the end of fiscal year 2002. These fees were required to be paid by the 1982

Act upon acceptance of nuclear spent fuel generated by these individual utilities. Requiring the payment of outstanding one-time

fees in fiscal year 2002 was necessary to assure that H.R. 1270 does not violate budgetary pay-go limitations. That was the

only reason the committee adopted this provision.

Opponents of H.R. 1270 have argued that the bill imposes tremendous burdens on taxpayers. Nothing could be further from

the truth. The nuclear waste program has always been funded by consumers through fees on electric generation by nuclear

power plants. Consumers will continue to fund the program through fees provided by H.R. 1270. The only cost, the only cost

under H.R. 1270, is the cost of disposing of the defense waste. It is wholly appropriate that taxpayers fund this cost, since the

benefits of our defense activities accrue to all taxpayers, not to just the consumers of utilities with nuclear power plants.

[Page: H9658]

[TIME: 1700]

I understand the opponents of H.R. 1270 also assert that this bill preempts State and local transportation and safety

requirements. That assertion also is completely false.

State and local governments are preempted from establishing inconsistent transportation safety requirements by existing

Federal transportation laws, not in H.R. 1270.

Mr. Chairman, I would urge my colleagues to certainly support H.R. 1270.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today as cosponsor of H.R. 1270, the Nuclear Waste Act of 1997, a bipartisan bill that represents a lot

of hard work on the part of members of the Committee on Commerce and the Subcommittee on Energy and Power to find

what the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Dan Schaefer, has deemed `a temporary solution to a critical and immediate

problem,' and that is the storage of our nation's spent nuclear fuel.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is certainly necessary. For one reason it is outrageous that the Department of Energy has failed in its

quest, failed in the direction that this Congress has given them. This legislation is necessary because of that failure to find a

permanent repository by the year 1998.

So far DOE has fallen behind on its responsibility in that it predicts a disposal facility will not be operational until the fiscal year

2010, which is absolutely unacceptable. That is at the earliest, they say. In the meantime, ratepayers have paid in billions of

dollars to the Nuclear Waste Fund, with only about 15 cents on the dollar actually used for radioactive waste disposal

programs.

This is unacceptable and, frankly, it is unconscionable. If my colleagues would just be logical about it, for a lot of years nuclear

power has been a source of electricity supply across our country and we have known for many years that we have to find a

long-term solution to the storage of nuclear waste that is the by-product of that industry. If they are going to use it, it has got to

be stored. That is as logical as it can be.

DOE had a commitment to construct a permanent repository by 1998, but they have not lived up to that commitment, and that

is why we are here today. The lack of a storage facility is placing very unrealistic demands on our Nation's nuclear power

plants. Failure to act now could lead to the premature closing of some of our nuclear power plants and force additional costs

upon them for on-site storage.

It is talk about nuclear as in energy, and there are some here who are just opposed to nuclear energy, period. The gentleman

from Ohio is honest about that, and that is part of his speech and time that he will be using. But we see people out by nuclear

plants that have signs that say `No Nukes.' I go to schools and I say, `Children, how many of you are for nuclear energy?' And

they all hold up their hands that they are opposed to it. But when they hear the hard cold facts that we sent Japan searching for

energy, in World War II looking for energy, and that there is no question that President Bush sent 400,000 of our kids over to

that desert looking for energy, and when we point out to schoolchildren that, yes, energy or lack of energy causes wars and

explain that to them, then we tell them if we solve the energy problem, which this is a thrust in that direction, that those signs

that they hold up saying `No Nukes' can say `No Wars.' Then when asked the question again, the hands do not go up because

it is properly explained to them.

I think during the year, DOE has made some progress on the excavation of the main tunnel at the Yucca Mountain facility, but

we have got to encourage them to accelerate construction of the permanent facility. In the meantime we cannot afford to do

nothing. We cannot afford to wait another 12 years. It is important that we act now.

This Congress just voted a few moments ago overwhelmingly not to let any amendment sent up, frivolous or otherwise, or

sincere amendment or whatever, block the progress of this bill.

Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleagues, the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Bliley, and the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.

Dingell, ranking member, the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Dan Schaefer, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Upton, all of

the other members for their hard work, even some of those who were opposed to the bill who have sent up good suggestions,

some of them that we have taken and all of them that we considered.

But this thing started back in 1982. There was no Nuclear Policy Act. It said simply: `Ratepayers, you give us the money and

we will pick up your spent fuel.' And we did that. They have given us $13 billion. We have only spent $6 billion. In 1987,

Yucca Mountain was designated as the only place for the DOE to study for permanent repository and a vote in the House and

Senate took place.

I think in the appropriations bill in 1987, it may have been on December 21, 1987, the vote was for the fiscal 1998 budget

reconciliation conference report, H.R. 3545. That vote then was 237 to 181. And it is unfortunate that no one wants this area.

It is not politically selected by anyone.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry for the gentleman from Nevada [Mr. Ensign]. The gentleman is doing what he ought to do. The

gentleman is representing his district, representing his State. But this was considered at one time to be in Deaf Smith County,

Texas. Had it been selected, I would understand that we would have to have an act, but I would probably be in the same

position that these two gentleman are in who represent the State of Nevada.

But the hard cold fact is that the Nevada test site has been dedicated to nuclear uses for over 50 years. We have had 975

nuclear explosions there in the desert. They have studied Deaf Smith County; they turned that back. Since then, we have

studied Yucca Mountain for $6 billion dollars worth and still the repository will not be ready until 2010 or 2015. I say start it in

1998. That is what this bill says. `Light up or light out.'

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time

[Page: H9659]

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, as George Gershwin might say, `It's very clear, plutonium is here to stay. Not for a year, but forever and a day.

The Rockies may crumble, Yucca may tumble, they're only made of clay. But plutonium is here to stay.'

That is the problem, Mr. Chairman. It is here to stay; 10,000 years, 20,000 years. Nobody knows how long. This bill

presumes that it is very safe. `Do not worry about it: We are picking Nevada,' says the Congress. `We do not have any

geologic or scientific evidence that supports our decision, but we have decided that we are getting it off of all the sites that it

has been generated at and we are moving it to Nevada.'

Mr. Chairman, in this legislation, we are going to suspend a lot of protections which we give to Americans. We are going to

decide here today that each American could be exposed to 100 millirems of radiation. Now, in Sweden the standard is 10. In

Switzerland it is 10. In Canada it is 1. Even at the New Mexico waste isolation pilot project, it is 15 millirems. But here, we

are going to say that for

every 286 persons exposed, that one of them will contract a cancer. We are going to decide that today. We are going to

establish a level that does not allow the EPA to set these standards. We will decide them. That is what this bill says, and that is

wrong.

What else does the bill do? It says that it will be transported through 40 States of the Union in trucks and railroad cars, totally

indemnifying the trucking and railroad firms from any liability, even if they are engaged in willful misconduct, gross negligence.

They are not liable.

Now what disincentive as a result exists for these contractors to ensure that they have not hired drivers who drink excessively

in the evening, take antidepressants and then jump behind the wheel and drive 100 miles an hour through tunnels in highly

populated population areas in our country? None. This bill allows that to happen. They are not liable.

And who pays if there is an accident? Believe it or not, it is the ratepayers who will pick up the tab, the very people who may

have been victimized by an accident created in their neighborhoods.

And fourth, we have the Holy Roman Empire provision on NEPA. They used to say that the Holy Roman Empire was an

oxymoron. It was not really holy, Roman, or an empire. Well, that is what we have got here with the Environmental Impact

Statement that is built into this bill. It really does not evaluate the environment, it does not measure the impact it is going to have

on a community, and it is not much of a statement. But at least we have got the words in there.

Then we have the `interim storage' oxymoron. We have put a cap on how much money we are going to raise from now on

from nuclear utilities for permanent and interim storage. We are going to spend most of it on the interim storage. We are going

to build something that is above ground and interim, and we are going to pretend that we are going to come back and still have

a permanent waste repository built in this country.

A vote for this bill is a vote to kill a permanent repository in the United States permanently. This is an interim storage bill to just

get it off the books from the utility executives of today, and forget about any permanent solution.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that the Members who are listening to this debate vote for the amendments to protect the American

public.

Mr. DAN SCHAEFER of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Cooksey].

Mr. COOKSEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to engage the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Dan Schaefer, in a colloquy.

Mr. Chairman, the ratepayers of Louisiana have paid more than $134 million into the Nuclear Waste Fund only to see that

money used for purposes other than those specified by the law which mandated the collections. For that reason, I would like

to engage in a colloquy with the distinguished floor manager to propound a few questions on the bill before us, which I have

cosponsored.

As I understand the situation, one of the foremost improvements of the bill over current law are provisions which would ensure

that monies collected from ratepayers will be used for the purposes for which they were intended under the Nuclear Waste

Policy Act rather than being captured and used for other purposes because of discretionary spending limits imposed after the

Nuclear Waste Policy Act was enacted.

Mr. Chairman, I ask the gentleman, is this a fair representation?

Mr. DAN SCHAEFER of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COOKSEY. I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. DAN SCHAEFER of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is certainly correct. As is more fully explained in the

committee's report, the basic inequity arises from the fact that the current 1 mill fee assessed against nuclear generated

electricity is treated as a mandatory receipt to the Federal Government, and all programmatic expenses are treated as

discretionary spending.

Now, as a result, spending for the waste program from the Nuclear Waste Fund is thus counted against various discretionary

spending caps enacted after 1982 as a means of controlling overall Federal spending. As a result, while nearly $12 billion has

been generated in fees and interest, only a little over $4.8 billion has been spent on the program.

Mr. COOKSEY. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I further understand that any effort, other than the one proposed in the

bill, to create a situation where revenues and expenditures stand on the same side of the ledger, allowing annual revenues to

offset annual outlays, would result in a technical violation of the scoring rules of the Congressional Budget Office and the

Committee on the Budget.

The committee, therefore, had to find an accounting offset and the source of funds chosen for the offset was the onetime user

fees owed by certain utilities under contracts entered into with the Department of Energy after enactment of the original 1982

statute. Is this an accurate presentation?

Mr. DAN SCHAEFER of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would continue to yield, I would say to the gentleman,

that is accurate. For example, under the solution to this problem chosen by the committee in the last Congress, the termination

of the current mandatory 1 mill fee and the institution in its stead of a discretionary user fee, we were informed that we had

violated the budget rules because the Treasury would no longer be receiving these revenues on the mandatory receipts side of

the budget, even though the Treasury would be receiving user fee revenues on the discretionary side of the budget as an offset

for appropriations to fund the waste program.

Further, as the committee report indicates, 13 utilities availed themselves on the contractual option offered by the Department

of Energy to pay fees assessed against spent nuclear fuel they generated prior to the effective date of the 1982 act.

[Page: H9660]

[TIME: 1715]

By requiring these fees to be paid prior to the expiration of fiscal year 2002, the committee was able to generate a $2.7 billion

revenue offset which, as the committee report indicates, was necessary in order to assure that the legislation does not violate

the budgetary pay-as-you-go limitations.

Our understanding was confirmed in the letter of September 25, 1997, by CBO Director O'Neill to the gentleman from

Virginia [Mr. Bliley] as well as the September 18, 1997, letter from the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich], chairman of the

Committee on the Budget, to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Bliley].

Mr. COOKSEY. Is it true, Mr. Chairman, that such one-time fee payments will be credited to the balance of the Nuclear

Waste Fund and that the program will largely rely on annual user fees to fund both continuing progress on the repository at

Yucca Mountain and the interim self-storage facility mandated by the bill?

Mr. DAN SCHAEFER of Colorado. My colleague again is correct, Mr. Chairman. As the committee report states, it appears

that the annual user fee that averages one mill per kilowatt hour will be sufficient to continue development of the repository and

acceptance of spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste at the interim storage facility. Information supplied to the

committee by DOE indicates that in order to achieve these goals, a fee of one mill per kilowatt hour will be sufficient to

maintain progress on the repository and develop an interim storage facility.

Mr. COOKSEY. Mr. Chairman, is it not the case that contracts entered into between utilities and the Department of Energy

prior to the effective date of this act will continue in force unless both parties agree to a modification?

Mr. DAN SCHAEFER of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, that is correct. Section 2 of H.R. 1270 provides that such contracts shall

continue in effect under this act in accordance with their terms except to the extent that the contracts may have been modified

by the parties to that contract.

Mr. COOKSEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes and 30 seconds to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell], former

long-time chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce and present ranking member of the Committee on

Commerce.

(Mr. DINGELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, there is a funny thing about nuclear waste and other kinds of waste, too. Everybody wants

somebody to pick it up and they never want them to put it down anywhere.

We have a massive problem in this Nation. How are we going to resolve the problem we have with regard to high level and

low level nuclear waste? The answer is, we have got to begin somewhere.

The bill before us is a good bill. Every Member of Congress who has dealt with or thought about this issue has been frustrated

about the fact that we have not dealt with the problem. Money collected for the purpose of dealing with the question of storage

has been dissipated by the budgeteers and by the Committee on Appropriations. This bill addresses that problem. It solves it.

The bill goes further. The bill addresses the problem of where we are going to set up an interim storage place. That is

important. I will assure my colleagues that it is interim because, in the process of considering this legislation, we have seen to it

that there is not enough money for them to store enough of this waste that it can become a permanent storage facility. I am

aware of the concerns of my colleagues on that matter because they are important.

The bill does not impose any new protections on the carriers or the transporters of nuclear waste that have not been a part of

the protection of every nuclear contractor since the beginning of the program for nuclear power in this country, same as under

Price-Anderson.

I assure my colleagues that the Department of Transportation and the Department of Energy will see to it that this is moved

safely. If Members look at the casks and the carriers and the rules, they will find that they afford an abundance of protections.

I would think that probably the worst thing that would happen, if we have some kind of an accident involving one of these

vehicles, we would find that they had cracked the pavement because that is how strongly constructed the carriage devices and

how strongly constructed the containers are.

We have to resolve the problem. The bill provides reasonable environmental protections for everybody who is concerned, the

best that could be crafted. But it resolves an issue which is a matter of great concern to the Nation.

I am troubled that my friends from Nevada are not pleased with this legislation. The hard fact of the matter is, the studies that

have gone on so far have come up with about the best place. That is an area of which we have had not only extensive studies

of geology and safety and terrain stability and water, but also an area in which there have been extensive use of nuclear

explosives, I think unwisely, but nonetheless have done so. And the result will be that the best possible protection for

everybody can be done and will be done under this legislation.

I want to commend my dear friend, the ranking minority member, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Hall], the distinguished

gentleman from New York [Mr. Towns], the chairman of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Dan

Schaefer], the gentleman from Idaho [Mr. Crapo], the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hastert], the gentleman from Michigan

[Mr. Upton] and, of course, the chairman of the full committee for the work which they have done to bring us to the point

where we are today. This is a good bill. It is a step along a long and difficult route to resolve an important question which is

troubling everybody and which is causing huge problems for the Nation.

I urge my colleagues to support the legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I have long been frustrated with the pace of DOE's efforts, and the lack of any meaningful progress,

toward opening a permanent repository for nuclear waste. I have spoken previously about my keen disappointment that

there appears to be no way to recover the billions--literally billions--of dollars in ratepayer contributions to the Nuclear

Waste Fund which the Budget Committee has siphoned off and used for wholly unrelated purposes.

I regret to say that, despite our best efforts here today, this Congress is not in a position to remedy all of the problems

afflicting DOE's waste program. Nor can we guarantee that the repository will open on a date certain.

However, the bill before us is a marked improvement over current law. It is a bipartisan bill that passed the committee

by a vote of 43 to 3. At this time let me thank Chairman Tom Bliley for his hard work on this important issue. I also

want to congratulate my colleagues--Chairman Schaefer, Ranking Member Hall, and Congressmen Towns, Crapo,

Hastert, and Upton--for their contribution in working through some of the hard questions and introducing H.R. 1270.

This bill incorporates the following important provisions:

First, and foremost, the bill reforms the funding basis for the waste program, and ensures that every dollar contributed

by ratepayers will be spent on the nuclear waste program--and nothing else. By transforming utility payments for nuclear

waste into a user fee, the substitute puts an end to the diversion of these funds and ensures they will be applied

exclusively for their intended purpose--the Yucca Mountain project.

Second, the substitute authorizes an appropriate interim storage facility. This facility will open in 2002, and will accept

waste at nearly twice the rate DOE projects under its acceptance schedule. This is the least we can do, given the

tardiness of the current program.

At the same time, however, it is essential that interim storage not become a de facto substitute for the permanent

repository. In recognition of this, the substitute limits the capacity of the interim storage facility to about half of what the

repository will accept--so that a healthy constituency remains for completing work on a permanent disposal facility.

Third, we cannot escape the fact that building two facilities simultaneously costs more than building one. If we direct

DOE to build interim storage at the same time it is building the repository, we also must ensure adequate funding for

both facilities.

Therefore, the bill permits an increase in the annual 1 mill per kilowatt-hour fee during peak construction years.

However, ratepayers will pay no more in the long run because any such increase must be offset by lower fees in other

years--so that the average annual fee over the next 12 years is no more than 1 mill. In order to provide additional

assurance to ratepayers, utilities, State regulators that annual use fees will not spike dramatically, the bill imposes a 1.5

mill annual cap.

In summary, this bipartisan bill will make a number of important changes in the nuclear waste program that will protect

our consumers and our environment. I urge its passage.

[Page: H9661]

Mr. DAN SCHAEFER of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Idaho [Mr. Crapo].

Mr. CRAPO. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to speak in support of this important piece of legislation, the

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997. This is a very important issue to Idaho because, as I think most people now understand,

Idaho has been the recipient of a significant amount of the spent nuclear fuel in the country to be stored on a supposedly

temporary basis, but the progress toward permanent storage needs to be resolved and the interim storage facility issue needs

to be resolved.

Idaho currently has 260 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel and 10,000 cubic meters of high level nuclear waste, and we must

proceed with resolving this issue to protect the geologic areas of Idaho that are now jeopardized by the permanent, apparently

permanent storage of the waste in those locations.

The point I would like to make is that Idaho is not unique here. Perhaps it is Idaho that has had a significantly larger amount of

the spent nuclear fuel shipped to it, even though it has not generated any. But this bill is very much proenvironment because it

removes nuclear spent fuel and high level nuclear waste from over 100 sites to only one remote site.

My friend from Massachusetts said that, in his argument against this bill, that we will see spent nuclear fuel transported through

40 different States. I think a better way to point it out is that we will see spent nuclear fuel transported out of about 40 States

and out of over 100 sites to only one remote site where the location has been designed to have the least amount of

environmental impact.

With regard to that transportation issue, the regulatory regime for radioactive material transport has worked well in this

country. As the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell] just said, it will be transported safely.

Over the past 30 years there were 2,500 shipments of spent nuclear fuel in the United States. Since 1957, there have been

667 shipments of Navy spent fuel over 1 million miles. And in the last 22 years, the Department of Energy has transported

nuclear weapons and special materials nearly 100 million miles, and all of that has been done without radioactive release.

There has been an attack saying that there will be insufficient environmental analysis. Again, the true facts are that H.R. 1270

requires an environmental impact statement before every major Federal action in the Nuclear Waste Program. It is true that it

says that alternate sites are not to be evaluated, but that is because this Congress is designating the evaluating site. And those

who would say that a full environmental impact analysis is not being made are simply mischaracterizing the terms and provisions

of this legislation.

Mr. Chairman, this legislation is critical to this country. Last year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held,

in an important case, that DOE had a legal obligation to begin accepting this material by January of 1998. That cannot be done

unless this type of legislation is moved properly into place to provide for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel. This is

important, critical legislation to the country. I encourage its adoption by the House.

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kucinich].

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kucinich].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kucinich] is recognized for 4 minutes.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I would like to correct a few misconceptions that I have heard during this debate.

First of all, the American people were never asked to build nuclear powerplants. The industry made the decision to go ahead.

There was never a vote on it by the American people. The industry decided to build nuclear powerplants.

When the nuclear power plants were built, there were no plans by the industry at that time to talk about how the waste would

be dealt with.

There are myths about the disposal of nuclear waste. First of all, we cannot dispose of nuclear waste. It lasts for thousands and

thousands of years, something the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey] pointed out. I would like to add that we

cannot move it either, because once it is on a site, that site is contaminated. We cannot transport it out of anywhere. Nuclear

power sites essentially are scorched Earth. That land will never be used again for anything.

Right now there are nearly 109 nuclear dump sites in America. When the waste is moved to Yucca Mountain, there will be

110 contaminated sites, not 109 less. When it will be moved from Yucca Mountain, then there will be 111 contaminated sites.

Nuclear power promised power too cheap to meter. It delivered electricity too expensive to use. It promised safe electricity.

Three Mile Island and Chernobyl put the lie to that.

The nuclear power industry has caused utility rates to go up across this country. In my State of Ohio in the northern part of our

State, utility rates are twice as high as they are in the southern part of the State. Everyone in this country who has nuclear

power as a source of energy knows why their electric bills are so high.

Now the ratepayers are being told that they will pay more under this bill. Utility rates will go up even higher, and why? To bail

out an industry that has built plants that have been neither used nor useful. The nuclear power industry has been holding up

utility deregulation until they can dump the responsibility for nuclear waste, re: that stranded investment, on to the residential

ratepayers and the small businesses and the taxpayers. This bill is the first step.

[TIME: 1730]

The waste belongs to nuclear power plants. But by law, when this bill is passed, the Department of Energy takes title. And

who is the Department of Energy? The taxpayers of the United States of America. It is then the waste belonging to the people,

their responsibility. If there is an accident, the taxpayers will end up paying for it. The waste will last for thousands of years.

The taxpayers will end up paying to monitor it. The taxpayers will end up having to pay to isolate it from the biosphere. The

taxpayers. The taxpayers. The taxpayers will buy a nuclear pig-in-a-poke waste dump and be stuck with the bill for it forever.

There is no known technology which can safely isolate the waste from the biosphere. The transportation of waste through

populated communities, 50 million Americans will live within a half mile of the nuclear transportation routes, ensures that there

will be a significant hazard to major populated areas.

The safety issues have not been adequately met in this legislation. There were amendments that were never even able to get out

of the Committee on Rules that would have protected major population areas. This bill will, I believe, begin the dawning of

new civic activism in the United States from people who are fed up with a nuclear industry which has in some cases ruined our

economy because of high electric rates, passed the bill on to the ratepayers, and now wants to stick the American taxpayers

with hundreds of billions of dollars of debt.

Mr. DAN SCHAEFER of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how much time we all have remaining?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Dan Schaefer has 11 1/2 minutes remaining; the gentleman from

Texas, Mr. Hall has 18 1/2 minutes remaining; the gentleman from Alaska, Mr. Young has 10 minutes remaining; and the

gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey has 4 minutes remaining.

Mr. DAN SCHAEFER of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, might I ask the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Hall] if he has some more

speakers here?

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Sawyer].

Mr. SAWYER. Mr. Chairman, 50 years ago in April 1947, a ship in the Texas City harbor bearing a cargo of now what

stands before us all, after Oklahoma City, as an indelible memory of ammonium nitrate fertilizer was destined for war-torn

Europe. That morning that ship caught fire a little after 9 a.m.

The Texas City disaster, as it has come to be known, happened as the ship exploded. Within moments, the Monsanto

Chemical Plant that was nearby was in flames as entire buildings collapsed, trapping people inside. Fires quickly spread to the

refineries that made up the Texas City industrial complex, with the force of a small nuclear weapon, setting off a tidal wave,

causing a disaster that resulted in nearly 600 deaths in a town of about 16,000.

We have come a very long way in 50 years. Fortunately, we have learned from our mistakes. We understand the dangers of

densely populated areas, and we have gotten very good at taking the right precautions and anticipating as many scenarios as

possible.

But nothing is ever 100 percent foolproof, no matter how close we may come. If my colleagues believe that transporting the

Nation's spent nuclear fuel to an interim storage facility makes sense, then they would have to agree, whether they agree with

that principle or not, it should be done as safely as possible. If the unforeseeable or improbable does happen somehow, we all

want the risks to human life or health to be as low as can possibly be.

In the committee I offered an amendment that would have added language directing the Secretary to choose routes for spent

nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to minimize transportation through populated areas. There may be cases where it

is safer to use routes that are nearer to areas of population because of superior rail lines or highways. However, where track or

road quality and other factors are otherwise equal, it is clear the Secretary should take into account proximity to human beings.

My intent is to enhance safety, not compromise it. I want to thank the chairman for working with me and my staff over the

intervening weeks and for including my amendment as part of his own.

In the light of the progress in the work of the committee, I support this bill. I share the concerns of many, but I believe that the

chairman and ranking members of the full committee and subcommittees have made an extraordinary good-faith effort to

address the concerns of Members like me who care about safety in densely-populated urban areas, as I believe virtually all of

us do. And I think that right now, with the clock running, this represents a sound path toward a more permanent solution.

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Cummings].

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, while I do not support this bill, I do believe that we must solve our nuclear waste problem.

This bill is merely a temporary fix for a problem that has long-term implications. Our Nation is at a crossroads. We have

benefited from nuclear technology. We are a Nation that has won wars and deterred others because of nuclear science. This

technology is a cheap and efficient way to light our towns and cities. We have paid a price for this benefit.

Over the last 50 years, our Nation has generated tens of thousands of tons of highly radioactive nuclear materials and waste. I

cannot stress the importance of finding a permanent and viable solution to the disposal of these wastes.

I have many fundamental problems with the bill before us that can be solved if the issue were given further consideration. This

legislation allows for nuclear waste to be stored above ground in so-called interim storage facilities located in the State of

Nevada. I am concerned that legal limitations to ensure that interim storage does not become permanent storage will be

eroded.

The bill does not adequately address public health and safety protections relating to transportation, interim storage, and

permanent disposal of nuclear waste. My constituents in Baltimore, as customers of the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company,

pay into their nuclear waste fund, which is designed to cover costs of both interim storage and the permanent repository. I

worry that places a continuous burden on utility customers around the country because this bill does not create a permanent

repository.

I urge my colleagues to vote against this bill. We have much more work to do to ensure the protection of the public health,

safety and environment.

Mr. DAN SCHAEFER of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Knollenberg].

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Dan Schaefer] for yielding me the time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 1270. I also want to salute the original drafter of this bill, the gentleman from Michigan

[Mr. Upton], for his work.

I want to talk a little bit about safety. I want to also talk about Halloween for a moment, because it seems Halloween is not

until Friday but the gloom and doom stories have already begun. The myths about a `mobile Chernobyl' are about as credible

as the legend of the headless horseman.

I know that transportation is a problem. Some Members have spoken about that. Safety is a problem, as well. I want to speak

to both of those issues quickly.

Consider the record: 30 years of experience, 2,400 shipments of spent nuclear fuel, over 1.5 million miles logged in this

country, does not include the 100 million miles that the gentleman from Idaho [Mr. Crapo] talked about on the nuclear

weapons side, and all of this movement with zero radioactive releases and no harm to the environment or American citizens.

The casks are engineered safe. They are tested, they are demonstrated, and they are certified safe by the NRC, the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, for transportation.

I would like to focus on this chart. These are some of the tests that have taken place with respect to the casks. They include a

30-foot free-fall; a puncture test onto a steel rod, 6 inches, dropped from a height; a collision, get this, a collision with a

speeding locomotive at 80 miles per hour; and fire at over 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit. I know the chart says 1475, but beyond

that it has gone over 2,000. If that is not enough, these same casks were submerged underwater for 8 hours, all with no

radiological releases. This technology is currently being used around the globe, so these casks are safe.

Opponents argue that H.R. 1270 infringes on State and local jurisdictions. We already heard a little bit about that. But, rather,

H.R. 1270 requires advance notification to State and local governments before spent fuel crosses their jurisdiction and the

defers to the States on designating the best routes. Transportation is safe.

I urge my colleagues to vote for this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Colorado, [Mr. Dan Schaefer] has 9 1/2 minutes remaining. The gentleman from

Texas [Mr. Hall] has 14 3/4 minutes remaining. The gentleman from Nevada [Mr. Ensign], who has been the designee of the

gentleman from Alaska, has 10 minutes remaining. And the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey] has 20 minutes

remaining.

Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, we have heard several things from the proponents of the bill. I just want to say first of all, on the issue of

urgency, a 1989 MRS Commission review found no safety advantage to centralizing the storage of spent fuel, taking it from all

of these sites to one. In 1996, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board analyzed the issue of interim storage and concluded

there is no urgent need, no urgent need, for centralized storage of commercial spent fuel. No need, no compelling necessity, no

safety advantage to be achieved. That was 1996.

Now the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board underwent a change in the composition of the chairmanship. So, in effect,

there was an opportunity for a new board composed of new members to review whether or not they would agree with the

position taken by the predecessors in 1996.

In testimony on February 5, 1997, Dr. Gerard L. Cohen, the chairman of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, Dr.

Cohen simply reaffirmed the position taken by his predecessors that there is no need, either for technical or safety reasons, to

move spent fuel to a centralized storage facility for the next few years. He further maintains that to maintain credibility of the site

selection process, any decision with respect to interim storage should be deferred until a technological site suitability decision

can be made about Yucca Mountain.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

[Page: H9663]

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Towns], an original

cosponsor of this legislation.

Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Chairman, let us put the facts on the table. In 1982 Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which

placed responsibility for the management of spent nuclear fuel, beginning in 1998 and for its ultimate disposal, with the Federal

Government.

Since 1982 Congress has watched as successive Departments of Energy have attempted to move Federal nuclear waste

programs forward, without any success, for a variety of reasons. Progress in this crucial problem has been painstakingly slow.

How long must we wait?

Last year, this inaction resulted in a number of utilities suing the Department of Energy to fulfill their obligation to accept spent

nuclear fuel beginning January 31, 1998. The U.S. Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the utilities on this issue. However, there

is still no mechanism in place to establish an interim storage site that would enable the department to move forward with the

acceptance of the waste.

The establishment of an integrated spent fuel management system, as established by our bill, H.R. 1270, will permit the

Secretary to realize safety, efficiency and the economic benefit of a comprehensive design. In short Mr. Chairman, a

centralized interim storage facility would mean high-level waste would be consolidated at one site instead of 40 different sites

throughout this country.

Let me assure my colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey], who painted a picture of trucks running 100

miles an hour through tunnels, let me assure him that they will be ticketed.

Now, some have argued that the utilities are merely crying wolf, that an interim facility is not needed because utilities can

expand their own site storage. Well, let me stress here today that an interim facility is absolutely critical. The Nation's 107

nuclear plants face storage emergencies today. As we consider this legislation, 10 plants no longer have room in their original

facilities. Next year, 27 will run out of space. And by 2010, 80 will lack any capacity to store waste at all.

Moreover, H.R. 1270 postpones construction of an interim storage facility until the year 2002.

[TIME: 1745]

This 4-year delay will give the Secretary of Energy an opportunity to submit a viability assessment of the Yucca Mountain

repository to the President and this Congress. Since 1982, utilities have paid over $13 billion into a nuclear waste fund. Yet the

Federal Government has not lived up to its responsibility to establish a Federal storage facility. We must stop shucking and

jiving. Let us not delay any longer our responsibility to store the Nation's nuclear waste. I urge my colleagues to vote aye and

stop the procrastination. The time to move is now.

Mr. DAN SCHAEFER of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Smith].

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be good for all of us

to face up to the fact that today we are dealing with a solution of disposing of one of the wastes of an industrialized society.

In 1971, during the beginning of the Arab oil embargo, the Secretary of Agriculture asked me to be Director of Energy for

USDA. Almost every morning at 6:30 a.m., we went over to the White House with Bill Simon and we talked about the

problem. At that time we were importing about 50 percent of our energy needs. We came up with what we thought were wise

ideas to deal with the problems. We started to subsidize the development of alternative fuels. We decided to start subsidizing

such things as mass transportation to increase efficiency of energy in this country. And we started talking about the wisdom of

expanding the production of nuclear energy. We also discussed what do we do with the waste generated by the production of

energy by nuclear power. We talked about the possibility of burying it in the ocean. We actually talked about the possibility of

putting it into outer space and keeping it in orbit.

But instead there seemed to be no good solution, and nothing was accomplished. Over the years nuclear waste has continued

to be stored outside the generating facilities where it occurs. None of the ways that we generate energy is benign. They all have

serious problems. Most of our energy is generated by coal (56 percent). If the administration has their way at the Kyoto

Conference, what we are going to do is imply that we should expand the generation of nuclear energy in order to decrease

coal generated power.

It is interesting to note that after our discussions in 1971 and 1972 of where to go on expanding nuclear energy production to

be more self-sufficient in the United States, the following year, in 1973, a request by a utility company to build the last nuclear

energy plant to be built was received. I would suggest that this country is never going to again develop another nuclear energy

generating plant.

The government promised the people of this country in 1982 that government would take the responsibility to get rid of the

existing generated nuclear waste. In return utilities using nuclear power, through their customers would pay additional `taxes'

and send it to Washington. Over the years those ratepayers have paid in an additional $13 billion.

Now we are dealing with what the government promised to do. I compliment the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Upton] for

bringing this legislation to us. We are moving ahead. Eventually we are going to find other sources of energy in this country. But

until then we have got to be responsible to make sure Washington keeps their promise. We have got to be responsible to

develop the best possible ways to deal with nuclear waste disposal. It is much more logical at this time to put this waste in a

centralized location rather than spread it over 38 States.

Delays and cost overruns have created a national nuclear waste policy of stop-gap measures and ad hoc solutions

instead of centralized, streamlined results. Today, highly radioactive waste sits scattered at over 80 different locations in

38 states.

Fred Upton's bill will help establish an interim storage facility while work continues on the permanent solution--that way

we can get nuclear waste away from vulnerable areas like the shores of Lake Michigan and the Chesapeake Bay.

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Colorado [Ms. DeGette], a valued member

of the Committee on Commerce.

Ms. DeGETTE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be clear. Many of us understand that we need a sensible policy for getting rid

of nuclear waste that threatens many of our metropolitan areas. In my City of Denver, we are right downwind of some nuclear

waste at Rocky Flats that will need to be disposed of. But we should not send this waste to uncertified sites and we should not

send this waste along urban corridors that are going to be destructive for transportation purposes.

The National Waste Technical Review Board, a nonpartisan body created by Congress to evaluate the technical and scientific

validity of the Department of Energy's program to manage the permanent disposal of the Nation's civilian spent fuel and

high-level radioactive waste issued its report to Congress in March. The Board believes that the viability assessment, which will

be completed by September 30, 1998, will not provide adequate information for establishing Yucca Mountain as a repository

site.

Mr. Chairman, the gallery is not in order and it is difficult for me to proceed.

[Page: H9664]

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would remind the guests in the gallery, you are guests and we ask that you respect the rules of

the gallery, and that is to keep silent during the proceedings.

The Chair apologizes to the gentlewoman. The gentlewoman may proceed.

Ms. DeGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Specifically, the board's report states that a decision to locate the Nation's primary centralized storage facility for spent fuel at

or near Yucca Mountain should be deferred until the suitability of the site as a repository location has been determined.

The suitability of Yucca Mountain as a permanent site will not even be determined until the year 2001. Why then are we going

to send this high-level nuclear waste from the East Coast, from around the country, across 40 States of this country, including

places like the Mousetrap, which as Members can see through this map, runs right through the center of downtown Denver,

and the location in which 8 years ago a torpedo fell off a truck completely shutting down the city for 8 hours? Why would we

send this waste to an uncertified site only to have it be sent somewhere else? And why would we send it through corridors like

downtown metropolitan areas where millions of citizens could be at risk?

It makes no sense. I do not understand where we are rushing to transport this nuclear waste until the site is certified. In

addition, there is no national standard requiring emergency response training for communities along transportation routes so if

there is an accident in the Mousetrap the local law enforcement officers know what to do. There is no requirement that these

officials even be notified of the transport.

For all of these reasons, this is a premature bill, it is a bad response to a very real problem that we have in this country. I urge

my colleagues to oppose passage of this bill until we find a permanent site for this nuclear waste and until we find a reasonable

transportation solution.

Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record this letter from the President of the United States indicating that he

would veto H.R. 1270.

The text of the letter is as follows:

Statement of Administration Policy

If H.R. 1270, as reported by the Commerce Committee, were presented in its current form, the President would veto the bill.

H.R. 1270 would undermine the credibility of the Nation's nuclear waste disposal program by designating a specified site for

an interim storage facility before the viability of that site as a permanent geological repository has been assessed.

The Administration is committed to resolving the complex and important issue of nuclear waste storage in a timely and sensible

manner. The Federal government's long-standing commitment to permanent, geological disposal should remain the basic goal

of high-level radioactive waste management policy. This Administration has instituted planning and management initiatives to

accelerate progress on determining the suitability of Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as a permanent geologic disposal site.

H.R. 1270, however, would establish Nevada as the site of an interim nuclear waste storage facility before the viability

assessment of Yucca Mountain as a permanent geologic repository is completed. Moreover, even if Yucca Mountain is

determined not to be viable for a permanent repository, the bill would provide no plausible opportunity to designate a viable

alternative as an interim storage site. Any potential siting decision concerning such a facility ultimately should be based on

objective, science-based criteria and guided by the likelihood of the success of the Yucca Mountain site.

In addition, the Administration strongly objects to the bill's weakening of existing environmental standards by preempting all

Federal, State, and local laws inconsistent with the environmental requirements of this bill and the Atomic Energy Act. This

preemption would effectively replace the Environmental Protection Agency's authority to set acceptable radiation release

standards with a statutory standard. In addition, the bill would undermine the purposes of the National Environmental Policy

Act by, among other things, creating significant loopholes in the environmental assessment process.

Finally, the completion of a permanent geological repository is essential not only for commercial spent fuel disposal, but also

for the cleanup of the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons complex and the disposal of its weapons-grade materials. In

addition, these actions are necessary to further U.S. international nuclear nonproliferation objectives. H.R. 1270 would, in the

near term, put interim storage activities in competition with actions needed to complete the permanent geologic repository.

Consequently, the bill's enactment could delay the appropriate disposition of our surplus weapons-grade materials.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Nevada [Mr. Gibbons], who sits on the Committee on Resources, the

major environmental committee, who voted this bill out unfavorably.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman for yielding me this time, and I do want to address some of the

myths that I have heard expressed here today about H.R. 1270. First of all, I want to address the issue of the ostrich policy, of

sticking your head in the sand and hoping that nobody else sees the problem.

When I was a child, this reminds me of what my mother told me about 3 monkeys. Hear no evil, see no evil and speak no evil.

It is odd that those people who are in support of this bill are exactly those ones who have nuclear waste in their backyard that

want to get it out. They are the ones that have benefited from this issue. Now they want to get rid of it and they want to get rid

of it by the most expedient method possible, getting it wherever it is into the State of Nevada.

Let me address the issue about the interim storage site versus the permanent storage site. They are not one and the same. They

are miles apart. The interim storage site is a nuclear test site. Yes, indeed we did detonate some nuclear weapons there years

ago. We regret we did that. We regret that the State of Nevada almost paid the whole price for the nuclear industry. But the

permanent site is miles away. It is not even co-located. We are making two sites in Nevada, not one.

Second, we are not talking about some magic cosmic mode of transportation. We are not just picking this stuff up and then

setting it down, as I heard someone say earlier. What we are doing is shipping this through communities, 43 States, hundreds

of communities, numerous schools with children at play. Let me say when we look at this map here, this is where we are

sending it through this country. These are the rail and highway systems through which we are bringing most of it from east of

the Mississippi River, west to Nevada, right there.

Transportation is probably the biggest issue we have got here today. The likelihood of an accident is more than just a remote

possibility. It is a reality. When we look at this accident, this is a train accident, a recent train accident. I hope people vote

against this.

Let me talk about some of the standards that I have heard here today. We have dropped one of these casks from a standard

height of 30 feet. Mr. Chairman, it is 450 feet off Hoover Dam to the bottom. That is a little more than 30 feet. This cask

would not stand up to the drop of 450 feet into the bottom of the Colorado River at the base of this dam. I guarantee my

colleagues that this cask would be in that water more than 8 hours. Fires with metal containing titanium or other metals burn at

a temperature of in excess of 3,000 degrees. That is a little more than the fire that they have exposed these casks to. This is a

kind of accident that could occur, that will occur if we allow this stuff, this nuclear waste, the most dangerous stuff known to

man, to be transported across our community, through our States, next to schools. It is a danger to every American. We ought

to oppose this bill. We ought to reject it outright, and we ought to change the policy from burial.

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Gordon], a member of the

committee.

Mr. GORDON. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in favor of H.R. 1270. Many Americans have a temporary nuclear storage site

close to home. My own State of Tennessee has a legacy of high level nuclear waste that is stored onsite. The nuclear weapons

that were built in Oak Ridge helped this entire Nation win World War II and the Cold War. Now we have the opportunity

through the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997 to establish a central storage facility in an underpopulated area that would be

easier, safer and more economical to monitor.

[Page: H9665]

[TIME: 1800]

I understand the concerns of my colleagues who oppose this bill. I know that no one wants a nuclear storage site in their

backyard, but there is no magic wand that will make this waste go away. It is here, we have no choice but to deal with it. We

need a solution to this growing problem, and the repository at the Yucca Mountain offers the best opportunity.

The Southern Governor's Association took steps in this direction earlier this month by passing a resolution in favor of H.R.

1270. Additionally, we cannot ignore the fact that consumers have paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund to store this waste. TVA

alone has expended over $20 million in additional funds because DOE has failed to take this waste.

We must assure the public of the safety of any repository. The nuclear industry has been storing fuel in 34 States for more than

three decades. Though the industry is now safely managing used fuel, long-term on-site storage was never intended.

A central storage facility to keep much of this waste is necessary, and the Yucca Mountain fits the requirement for safe storage

of spent nuclear fuel.

Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1270 meets the public's need for a safe alternative for temporary used fuel storage at one site until a

permanent storage facility is completed. This is a long overdue solution to a difficult issue.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would announce that the order of closing will be the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.

Markey, first; the gentleman from Nevada, Mr. Ensign, second; the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Hall, third; and the

gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Dan Schaefer, fourth.

Mr. DAN SCHAEFER of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 1/2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois [Mr.

Hastert].

Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Chairman, we are looking at an issue that certainly covers a lot of folks' interests, and certainly the

people who oppose this piece of legislation certainly have a backyard interest of their own.

Mr. Chairman, 15 years ago, that is how long ago Congress originally passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. In 1992,

Congress envisioned that the Department of Energy would be accepting spent fuel by 1998. That is less than two months

away.

Fifteen years ago, Ronald Reagan was two years into his first term, Tip O'Neill was Chairman, typewriters, not computers

were the norm, and the Soviet Union was still considered the evil empire.

But perhaps most telling was the fact that 1992 was still a full two years before the Chicago Cubs would make it to

post-season play. If you are a Cubs fan, you will know how long that really was.

Mr. Chairman, unfortunately though, after billions of dollars and a decade and a half, we are only a few steps closer to opening

a permanent repository than we were in 1982. This bill replaces the sluggish action that has plagued DOE's Nuclear Waste

Program with specific achievable deadlines and ensures that another 15 years will not pass before the Federal Government

lives up to its responsibility of accepting spent fuel.

Mr. Chairman, we have spent billions of dollars looking into this issue. We have assessed from ratepayers, not taxpayers, but

ratepayers. Every time somebody pays their utility bill, we are reaching into their pocket and we have taken billions of their

dollars. What has the Federal Government been able to deliver for that billions of dollars? Absolutely nothing.

The ratepayers, our constituents, Mr. Chairman, know that it is time for this Congress to take the bull by the horns and deliver

the promise that it made in 1982.

Mr. Chairman, we need to pass this bill. We need to fulfill the promise to the American people that this country will have a safe

and sound nuclear waste policy. We cannot allow another 15 years to go by. Regardless of what we hear on the floor today,

we need to find an environmentally sound and permanent solution to the management of spent nuclear waste.

Mr. Chairman, I include the following for the Record.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

H.R. 1270 (passed E+P subcmte. 21-3) S. 104 (passed Senate 65-34)

TRANSPORTATION

--No rail access directly to Yucca Mtn. But contemplates the possibility of future rail access

--Use heavy-haul from main rail line at Caliente, NV to Yucca Mtn

--Construction and operation of railroad requires NEPA review

--Advanced state notification requirement

--State has preferred routes for transporting nuke waste

--Follows current HazMat regulations on transport of hazardous waste

--Heavy-haul must be ready by 1/31/2002

--No provision for transportation training requirements (this is major in the Senate's bill)

--Tech. assis. to states in case of emergency --No immediate rail access to Yucca Mtn. No later than one year after enactment of the bill, DOT will promulgate routing rule for nuclear waste by rail to Yucca.

--Heavy haul capability must be ready 18 mos. After NRC issues a license for an Interim Storage Facility (ISF).

--Each state has preferred transportation routes.

--Gov's must be notified when fuel comes into state.

--Nationwide transportation educ. program.

--Major training requirements for indivs. involved in transportation. (This provision was important to gain the support of Dem. Members and the labor unions.)

MILL FEE AND ONE-TIME FEES

--Beginning FY99 & opening of perm. repos. the annual mill fee must avg. to 1 mill. & can't exceed 1.5 mills. After perm. repos. is functional, mill fee capped at 1 mill

--One-Time Fees paid in 2002 --Capped at 1 mill. (See below for pros and cons).

DEFENSE WASTE

--DOE must accept fuel from defense activities (Crapo) --DOE must accept fuel from defense activities (Craig).

DEFENSE WASTE FACILITY (ISF)

--To be located at Yucca Mountain

--Functional 1/31/2002

--Construc. begins when Sec'y applies for NRC license --To be located at Yucca Mountain

--Functional 6/30/2003.

INTERIM STORAGE CAPACITY

--Phase I: 10,000 MTU and licensed for 20 years. License must be filed within 12 months of enactment

--Phase II: capacity increased to 40K with an initial term of 100 years

--No specific date for start of phase II to begin operation --No phases for the development of the ISE.

--The capacity will be determined at the time of license appl. and based on emplacement schedule and expected date of perm. repository operation

--The capacity is expandable.

--Licensed for 40 year term.

PERMANENT REPOSITORY

--Sec'y must apply to NRC for construction authorization no later than 12/31/02

--Perm. Repos. will be functional 1/17/10

--If Sec. determines Yucca is not suitable, he must contact Congress w/in 6 mos. with recommendations for a new site --Requires DOE to continue with site characterization at Yucca.

--Requires DOE Sec. to apply to NRC for construction auth. no later than 10/31/01.

--Functional 2015.

PAYGO FIX

--The House has a 5 year budget window which must be addressed

--The House addresses its PAYGO shortfall by switching to a user fee in FY99 and collecting the outstanding one-time fees in 2002

--The fee is paid into the Treasury, not the Nuclear Waste Fund --The Senate has a 10 year budget window which must be addressed.

--The Senate addressed their PAYGO shortfall by continuing the mandatory receipt of $600 million during FY98. In FY99, it switches to a user fee until FY01 where the government collects only what it will spend on Yucca. In FY02, they collect the payment of one time fees. This scenario will cover the first 5 years. In FY02, they revert back to the mandatory $600 million receipts to pay for the next 5 years. (This user fee is suspended during this period and utilities are forced to pay the full amount to cover the PAYGO problem). In 2007, the user fee is reestablished. The fee is paid to the Treasury, not the Nuclear Waste Fund.

[Page: H9666]

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. Berry].

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 1270. Currently, a part of every electricity consumer's bill goes directly

into the Nuclear Waste Fund. This fund was set up by the Congress in 1982 and requires the Department of Energy to set up

a nuclear storage facility and begin accepting nuclear waste by 1998.

However, out of the over $12 billion that have already been paid into the fund, only $4.8 billion have been spent on waste

storage research and funding for storage facilities.

Since the Department of Energy has not constructed a waste storage facility, the other $7 billion has been diverted into

unrelated uses such as deficit reduction. This is the same type of problem we have with the Highway Trust Fund. Citizens

constantly pay into this fund, but they see nothing in return.

If the Department of Energy had performed its required actions, we would not be debating this bill. An interim storage facility

would already be in place and a permanent facility would be in the near future.

If the Department of Energy had performed its required actions, then this money would have been used for its intended

purpose, for managing the efficient disposal of nuclear waste.

Arkansans and other electricity consumers are already paying twice for nuclear waste, one payment into the Nuclear Waste

Fund and another payment to maintain on-site storage facilities across the United States. This double payment can and will be

halted with the passage of this bill.

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of all electricity consumers, I urge my colleagues to vote for H.R. 1270.

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. Miller].

(Mr. MILLER of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the legislation.

Mr. Chairman, when Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982, and then amended it in 1987, we made

certain agreements among ourselves, the utility companies and the American people.

One, we decided that the federal government would assume the responsibility for permanent disposal of high level

nuclear waste.

Two, we would limit our consideration of possible locations for such permanent disposal to Yucca Mountain in Nevada.

Three, the nuclear utilities would pay a fee to the US government to run the program and fund the construction of the

permanent facility.

And, four, the utility companies would keep their nuclear waste until we knew with certainty that the Yucca Mountain

repository would be built.

The bill before us today, H.R. 1270, fundamentally changes that covenant.

On October 8, the Resources Committee without one public hearing, reported unfavorably this extensive and

complicated bill, H.R. 1270.

Today, we are considering a bill that will overturn the decision we made to focus on construction of a safe, permanent

facility and instead mandate the immediate construction of a temporary storage site at Yucca Mountain in Nevada.

In so doing, the bill will prejudice the ongoing viability studies, and make it more difficult for us to learn whether Yucca

Mountain is the right place to permanently store high level nuclear waste.

Additionally, no one has done any scientific studies to determine whether the site specified in HR 1270 is safe for interim

storage of high level nuclear waste.

The bill will preempt all federal and state laws that the Secretary of Energy deems to be inconsistent, or that present an

obstacle, to implementation of this new law.

During the 1980's, Congress built a strong national policy on nuclear waste. We decided that the federal government

would take responsibility for the permanent disposal of high level nuclear waste. We decided to find the appropriate

location for that disposal and to build the permanent facility before moving tens of thousands of high level nuclear waste

now located at nuclear reactors across the country to the permanent disposal site. High level nuclear waste can be

moved safely; but, there is no reason to move it more than is necessary.

Yes, there have been problems with the Department of Energy's implementation of this plan. But, they appear to be on

the right track now. The science we need to make an informed and objective decision is nearly complete. HR 1270

would prejudice the determination on whether Yucca Mountain can and should contain the permanent repository for the

nation's high level nuclear waste by creating a de facto repository at the Nevada Test Site.

HR 1270 affirmatively preempts the National Environmental Policy Act. It legislates the selection and construction of an

interim storage facility on public lands without any scientific or environmental analysis to support the premise.

Current law prohibits the construction of an interim storage facility in Nevada, and limits the size of any other temporary

facility to 10,000 tons of waste. HR 1270 mandates that DOE build the interim facility in Nevada and allows up to

40,000 tons of high level nuclear waste to be immediately stored there--with no environmental compliance.

President Clinton will veto this bill if it reaches his desk. Senator Harry Reid and his Nevada colleagues are

unanimously opposed to this bill. I urge my colleagues to oppose H.R. 1270.

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield one minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey] is recognized for four minutes.

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I will include for the record letters from Erskine Bowles, the Chief of Staff to the President;

Franklin Raines, the Director of OMB; and a formal statement of administration policy expressing opposition to the bill and the

recommendation of the President's advisors that the bill be vetoed.

Mr. Chairman, we are at a very bad point right now. There was at least at the beginning of the discussion of the disposal of all

nuclear wastes in the United States some integrity in the process back in 1982. We set out to find the site, east of the

Mississippi, west of the Mississippi, wherever it may be.

But in 1987, we came back here to Congress, and many people were very upset about what was going on. They might have

been pro nuclear, but they did not want the waste in their district. So we passed another bill in 1987. What did we say?

Well, the Chairman of the House then came from Texas. He said, `I don't want it in Texas.' That was one of the sites. The

second site was in Washington State. The majority leader came from Washington State. He said, `I don't want it in

Washington State.' It was out. The third State was the salt domes in Louisiana. The Chairman of the Committee on Energy

came from Louisiana. He said, `I don't want it in Louisiana,' and it was out. The fourth site was in North Carolina. The ranking

Republican on the Committee on Commerce came from North Carolina. North Carolina was out. The fifth site was the solid

granite of New Hampshire, and Ronald Reagan and George Bush said, `That is out in 1988. We are not burying all the nuclear

waste in America in New Hampshire.'

So we kept searching, playing this game of thermonuclear hearts, trying to stick the queen of spades with somebody. So we

looked around, and what did we find? We found the State of Nevada, two Congressmen, two Senators. `You get all the

nuclear waste. We are picking you.'

Even that had some integrity. At least they were going to have to determine whether or not the site was suitable for all the

nuclear waste.

But, today, we come back again. We are not happy with that. There are still five years until the year 2002, from deciding

whether or not, in fact, Yucca Mountain is the right place for all the nuclear waste, but we cannot wait.

So what are we doing here today? We are going to decide to take all of the nuclear waste in America, put it on trucks, put it in

railroad cars, and ship it to Nevada, and put it in an above-ground mausoleum that is going to be finished in 2002, just in time

to have the site characterization process by scientists and geologists tell us that Yucca Mountain is not the right place for a

permanent repository.

As a result, we will have to begin the process all over again to find the right site, and eventually we will have to pack all the

nuclear waste up again, put it back in vans and trucks and railroad cars, and send it to another place in America.

Why are we doing this? We are doing this not because there is some emergency at any nuclear facility in America. In fact, we

are told that it is 100 percent safe at every facility right now. We are doing this because the nuclear industry does not want a

permanent repository. They do not want to have to pay for it.

They promised the American people that nuclear power was going to be too cheap to meter, and that they were going to be

able to bury the waste permanently. We now know it is the most expensive way of generating electricity. Wall Street killed

nuclear power it wasn't some ponytailed, granola-chomping protest force outside a nuclear power plant.

Secondly, they do not know where to bury the nuclear waste and they do not have any intention of paying for it, and they want

us to pretend here today that we are going to do something about it and stick the queen of spades with the State of Nevada.

Well, Mr. Chairman, this is a completely irresponsible position to take. It is intergenerationally irresponsible for this generation

to stick the next generation with the job and the cost of burying all this waste.

This is a bad bill. It is bad environmental policy. It is bad fiscal policy, and it is bad policy intergenerationally. I urge a no vote

on this bill as strongly as I can of any bill that has ever come out on this House floor.

Mr. Chairman, I include the letters referred to earlier for the Record.

The White House,

Washington, October 28, 1997.

Hon. Newt Gingrich,

Speaker of the House of Representatives,

Washington, DC.

[Page: H9667]

Dear Mr. Speaker: It is my understanding that the House of Representatives soon will consider H.R. 1270. I am writing to

reiterate the Administration's objection to this legislation. If the bill were presented to him in its current form, the President

would veto it.

As I have stated previously, the Administration is committed to resolving the complex and important issue of nuclear waste

storage in a timely and sensible manner, consistent with sound science and the protection of public health, safety, and the

environment. The Federal government's long-standing commitment to permanent, geologic disposal--reflected in the Nuclear

Waste Policy Act of 1982--should remain the basic goal of high-level radioactive waste management policy.

Any decision on the siting of an interim storage facility should be based on objective, science-based criteria, and be fully

protective of public health and safety and the environment. This bill is unacceptable to the Administration because it falls far

short of those goals. Additionally, H.R. 1270 does not contain provisions to offset potential deficit increases in its early years;

consequently, if the bill were enacted, any deficit effects could contribute to a sequester of mandatory spending in each of FY

1999 through 2001.

Secretary Pena and the entire Administration remain committed to working cooperatively with the Congress and with all

involved stakeholders on nuclear waste disposal issues within the confines of the President's policy. The Department is on an

aggressive schedule to resolve the key unresolved scientific and technical questions about Yucca Mountain.

Sincerely,

Erskine B. Bowles,

Chief of Staff to the President.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,

Washington, DC, September 18, 1997.

Hon. Thomas J. Bliley, Jr.

Chairman, Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to advise you of the Administration's views on H.R. 1270, the proposed Nuclear Waste

Policy Act of 1997. The Administration shares your commitment to resolving the complex and important issue of nuclear waste

management in a timely and sensible manner, consistent with sound science and the protection of public health, safety, and the

environment. The Federal government's long-standing commitment to permanent, geologic disposal should remain the basic

goal of high-level radioactive waste management policy.

Congress established a process to ensure that sound technical judgment plays the primary role in determining whether a

particular site can host a permanent nuclear waste repository. Designating the Nevada Test Site as the interim waste storage

site at this point undermines the ongoing evaluation of Yucca Mountain as a permanent disposal site as required by the Nuclear

Waste Policy Act Amendments of 1987. In addition, the bill runs the risk of reducing resources needed for this effort. More

importantly, it could undermine the credibility of the Nation's nuclear waste disposal program by prejudicing the Yucca

Mountain permanent repository decision.

The Administration believes that a decision on the siting of an interim storage facility should be based on objective,

science-based criteria and should be informed by the viability assessment of Yucca Mountain. Therefore, the President has

stated that he would veto any legislation that would designate an interim storage facility at a specific site before the viability of a

permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain has been determined.

In addition, the bill presents a number of environmental problems, including the removal of the Environmental Protection

Agency from its responsibility for developing a radiation exposure standard and preempting the National Environmental Policy

Act and other applicable Federal, State and local laws.

The Administration understands the concerns of the utility industry, public utility commissions, and others about the inability of

the Department of Energy to accept spent nuclear fuel by January 31, 1998. Secretary PenÿAE6a has made every effort since

his confirmation to work cooperatively with the affected parties to find satisfactory ways of mitigating the impacts of this delay

and will continue to do so.

Thank you for your consideration of these views.

Sincerely,

Franklin D. Raines,

Director.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,

Washington, DC, October 24, 1997.

Statement of Administration Policy

H.R. 1270--NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT OF 1997