The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board
During this session of Congress, the nuclear industry has lobbied in favor of legislation to radically alter the nation’s nuclear waste policy by mandating the construction of an “interim” storage facility for the nation’s high-level nuclear waste at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The bills would designate NTS as the storage site before the completion of studies to determine whether nearby Yucca Mountain is a suitable site for a permanent repository.
On March 20, 1996, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board issued a report entitled “Disposal and Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel –Finding the Right Balance.” The Review Board is a non-partisan oversight body established by Congress under the current Nuclear Waste Policy Act to provide independent evaluation of the nation’s high-level waste program.
Many of the Board’s observations and conclusions contrast with the policies found in S. 104, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997.
Do we need a centralized interim storage facility now?
NWTRB
“There are no compelling technical reasons for moving commercial spent fuel to a centralized storage facility at this time.” (p. 30)
“[T]he Board has concluded that it makes technical, management, and fiscal sense to await the decision on the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site for repository development before beginning development of a federal centralized storage facility.” (p. 45)
S. 104
“The Secretary shall store spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste… at an interim storage facility… beginning not later than November 30, 1999.” (Sec. 101(b))
Are we ready to open a centralized storage facility?
NWTRB
“The process of licensing and developing a large federal centralized storage facility and the transportation infrastructure that goes with it would take time. Developing a transportation system will require the acquisition of sufficient numbers of trucks or rail cars and casks, the establishment of transportation routes, and the development of emergency preparedness plans at the affected state and local levels. As a result, the federal government could not begin accepting spent fuel at a facility much before 2002, and then not in significant amounts.” (p. 35)
S. 104
Transportation capacity is to be ready by November 30, 1999. (Sec. 202(a)(b)) 4400 metric tons of irradiated fuel are to have been accepted by the end of fiscal year 2002. (Sec. 507)
Could designation of an interim storage site now prejudice repository studies?
NWTRB
“Deciding now to develop a storage facility at or near Yucca Mountain, prior to a decision about the suitability of that site for repository development, could undermine seriously the credibility of the process established by Congress. Institutional momentum to develop a repository there could increase by creating the perception that the suitability of the site has already been determined.” (p. 28)
“Developing a storage facility at the NTS now could prejudice the later decision about the suitability of Yucca Mountain for repository development.” (p. 41)
S. 104
Designates the Nevada Test Site as the site for the interim facility, which overrides a prohibition in current law against placing interim storage in the state of Nevada.
If we open a central facility, how big should it be?
NWTRB
“The Board also recommends developing storage incrementally by limiting the amount that can be transported to Yucca Mountain until the repository has been licensed for construction.” (p. 45)
S. 104
A license application authorizing storage capacity of 40,000 metric tons must be submitted within 30 months of passage. If repository activities fall off schedule, the capacity increases to 60,000 MTU (Sec. 204(d)(3)).
Could an interim site become a de facto permanent repository?
NWTRB
“Requiring the DOE to develop and operate a centralized storage facility now could adversely affect the progress and credibility of the nation’s disposal efforts.” (p. 30)
“As in the past, much opposition will result from concern that a proposed storage site could become a de facto disposal site.” (p. 35)
“Assigning the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management any significant new activities at this time could compete for funding and other resources with site-characterization and repository development efforts at the Yucca Mountain site.” (p. 47)
S. 104
Eliminates the linkage between repository licensing and interim storage construction that is in current law.
Is shipping waste before the existence of a final destination wise?
NWTRB
“In a radioactive waste management system, one should strive to minimize the number of times spent fuel is handled. Ideally, leaving it at its source until shipment for disposal would be the most efficient approach to spent fuel management.” (p. 24)
S. 104
Mandates transport to the “interim” facility before a disposal capacity exists.
How should a centralized storage facility be financed?
NWTRB
“Given current funding projections, it appears that the Nuclear Waste Fund will only be marginally capable, at best, of supporting the long-term development and operation of a repository for the permanent disposal of spent fuel. Therefore, the costs of a limited federal storage facility could be recovered through a new fee assessed on the users of that facility. The costs of a large storage facility located at a repository site (which would be used for all spent fuel) could be recovered by increasing the current 1 mill-per-kwh fee going into the Nuclear Waste Fund. This would avoid having the taxpayer bear the costs of final closure of the repository.” (p. 46)
S. 104
Designates the waste fund as the source of financing for interim storage, but holds the waste fund fee at its current level. (Sec. 401)
Is the Nuclear Waste Fund adequate?
NWTRB
“[A]nalysts who conducted an independent financial and management review of the Yucca Mountain project suggested that the Nuclear Waste Fund as currently projected would be deficient by $3 to $5 billion.” (p. 21)
S. 104
Fixes the fee at its current 1.0 mill/kwh, but contains no provisions for the fee’s automatic adjustment to ensure full cost recovery. After 2002 the fee will be unable to generate surpluses and will only be adjustable downward. (Sec. 401)
Should the program employ rigid timetables?
NWTRB
“[A]ny long-term strategy and schedule should take the likelihood of surprises into account. Unanticipated technical questions could crop up during licensing, and it could take some time to resolve them in a scientifically and technical credible fashion…Therefore, the repository start date cannot be set with precision.” (p. 24-5)
S. 104
“No later than February 1, 2002, the Secretary shall apply to the Commission [NRC] for authorization to construct a repository.” (Sec. 205(a)(3))
How should repository site suitability be determined?
NWTRB
“[T]he bases for judging site suitability should be established and available in advance of the decision.” (p. 30)
S. 104
Revokes existing guidelines in federal regulations. “The Secretary shall modify or eliminate those site characterization activities designed only to demonstrate the suitability of the site under the guidelines.” (Sec 205(a)(1-2))
Is having only one storage site an equitable policy?
NWTRB
“The most geographically equitable approach to storage is to leave the spent fuel at reactors near the communities that have benefitted from the power generated. Developing several small regional storage facilities would achieve some moderate degree of geographic equity. A single, large centralized facility offers the least geographic equity.” (p. 34)
S. 104
Only Nevada, which has no nuclear reactors, is designated as a host state.
For more information, contact Bill Magavern or Auke Piersma: 546-4996;
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