Nuclear Security

NIRS comments on NRC proposed rulemaking to amend requirements to protect nuclear power plants from terrorism.

On the NRC issued its Final Director’s Decision dismissing the request for emergency enforcement action of August 10, 2004 regarding the vulnerability of the General Electric Mark I and II Boiling Water Reactor irradiated fuel storage ponds that are elevated to the top of the reactor building at 32 units in the United States. Read Nuclear Security Coalition letter of response to the petiotion here.

NRC Proposed Director’s Decision to the Nuclear Security Coalition August 10, 2004 emergency enforcement petition regarding the structural vulnerability of GE Boiling Water Reactor Mark I and II elevated nuclear waste storage ponds.

Supplemental filing of to NRC regarding the August 10, 2004 petition on the vulnerability of GE boiling water reactors as confirmed by findings in the National Academy of Sciences April 2005 public version of its classified report to Congress “The Safety and Security of Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage”

The National Academy of Sciences Report on “Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel,”        Title page/Content        Executive Summary        Chapter 1: Introduction and Background        Chapter 2: Terrorist Attack on Spent Fuel Storage        Chapter 3: Spent Fuel Pool Storage        Chapter 4: Dry Cask Storage and Comperative Risks        Chapter 5: Implementation Issues        References        Appendixes

, NRC response to Congress on the agency’s suppression of the National Academy of Science’s redacted summary of its report to Congress on reactor fuel pool vulnerability to terrorism as headlined in a front page story of the Washington Post, March 28, 2005, “Storage of Nuclear Spent Fuel Criticized.” (940Kb)